Communio – A proposal for an ecumenical, charismatic ecclesiology.

Introduction: N. T. Wright’s New Testament Foundations for Ecclesiology

The starting point, the a priori, for any ecclesiology must be an understanding of the Church as the people of God, an eschatological community that exists for the sake of those not yet apart of said community. N.T. Wright lays out the three primary criteria that defined the church in its first few decades, it was essentially baptismal, Eucharistic and disciplined.[1] Wright continues, “The problems which arose in relation to the care of the needy, particularly widows, are most readily comprehensible if we envisage the church, not as a part-time voluntary organization of the like-minded which left normal social and familial attachments unaffected, but as a group with definite boundaries.”[2] The question then becomes what are the boundaries that define the people of God? How should the church understand itself and what would a definitively “charismatic” ecclesiology look like? These are the questions that will be attempted to be addressed in a brief and admittedly shallow treatment, for the sake of space.  Perhaps the two major theological voices in modern ecclesiology and ecumenism are Volf and Küng. By synthesizing these voices into a duet perhaps a definitive and constructive “charismatic” ecclesiology can be ascertained and thus expressed.  The most pressing issue to face the church over the next hundred, or so, years will most likely not be issues of morality or politics but of ecumenism and the church’s self-understanding.[3]

Volf’s Participatory Ecclesiology

Primarily, Volf wants to equate the church with the expression of charisms, “Wherever the Spirit of Christ, which as the eschatological gift anticipates God’s new creation in history, is present in it ecclesially constitutive activity, there is the church.”[4] While this does not necessarily validate the expression or it’s experiential interpretation, it does make room for otherness inside of the community (which is an idea to be explored later). Volf will go on to try and transcend the disagreement between Free Church and Episcopal models of ecclesial criteria for what constitutes a church, unfortunately his definition borders on the overly subjective and begins to side more with the Free Church suppositions.[5] He states directly, “the presence of Christ is not attested merely by the institution of office, but rather through the multidimensional confession of the entire assembly.”[6] The consequence of this statement is the striping of any Sacramentology to the foundation of mere communal confession of faith, not an objective reality.[7] While Volf’s experiment in ecclesiology is right minded and often correct in its aims, the way in which he answers key issues is at the expense of history and ecumenism for the higher church traditions. What is needed is an understanding of the activity of the Spirit that is not objective solely or subjective merely.

Acknowledging the objectivity of the Spirit’s work within the subjective experience and expression is imperative. Room must be made for the work of the Spirit to communicate objectively through otherwise subjective means. Ultimately these experiences and expressions will be misunderstood, misinterpreted and misappropriated, but that does not mean we discard or devalue them. Volf’s disdain for Episcopal authority is directly related to his witnessing its abuse in the Balkans during the late eighties and nineties.[8] What is needed, in order balance Volf, is to embrace theological otherness within the community as a charism. Ecclesiological self-understanding as the community that embodies the objectively subjective work of the Spirit is a priori to a healthy ecumenism and view of the universal as well as local church.

Hans Küng’s Pneumatological Ecclesiology

Kärkkäinen makes an observation about Küng’s ecclesiology that is important. “As a real church, the faith community is composed of sinful men and women and it exists for sinful men and women. Küng’s view comes close to that of Luther, who regarded the church as the community of sinners. Therefore, the communio sanctorum as communio peccatorum is always in need of forgiveness…”[9] This self-perception on the part of the church is essential in that it requires self-criticism, self-criticism that lends itself to a more open ecclesiology, one that makes room for otherness inside of the community. Otherness inside of the Christian community is not only a self-evident fact of the current state of world Christianity as Volf points out[10], but can also be understood as a virtue, which Küng is rightly advocating.[11] When otherness is embraced in ecclesiology, not simply in a vague superficial manner but as ontologically legitimate otherness, it demonstrates two things. First, its mimics and reveals the identity of the church as the image of the Trinity, which is the argument of Ware[12], Lossky[13] and Zizioulas[14]. Second, it shows the church in her glory as the redemptive community that accepts and embraces the strangeness of the other.  Küng argues that without this ability to embrace the otherness that exists inside of the universal church in a real way there is a loss of legitimacy, or genuineness, in the ability to embrace the otherness outside the boundaries of the community.[15]

The natural consequence of accepting otherness as ontologically legitimate in ecclesiology is the ability to not only co-exist but also to enter into dialogue through common language, dialogue that leads toward communion. The goal of any ecclesiology with any legitimacy is not simply the defense of one’s theological system or traditions, as is all too often the case[16], but toward real familial communion that recognizes one Lord and one Baptism.

Küng, not unlike Volf, is explicitly interested in defining the church in terms of the ministry of the Holy Spirit.[17] Kärkkäinen notes, “Küng. . . emphasizes the fact that the Spirit of God who indwells the church is no ‘obscure and nameless power’. . . but is the concrete presence of God in Christ and derivatively in the church. . . the Spirit is the earthly presence of the glorified Lord in the Church.”[18] Küng goes onto to exposit the “charismatic structure of the church” paying much attention to issues of ecclesiastical authority and the tension between the laity and hierarchy. [19][20] The pertinent portions of Küng’s treatment lie in his persistence toward the oneness of the Church.[21] By placing his definition of the church in strictly Pneumatological terminology, Küng proves himself light years ahead of much of his ecclesiastical colleagues, He also provides the linguistic framework for a holistic charismatic ecclesiology, one that, hopefully, places the charismatic-Pentecostal understanding of the charisms within the linguistic traditions of the historical, sacramental church.

A Proposal for a Charismatic Ecclesiology

The cardinal issue in defining a distinctly charismatic ecclesiology will be with the definition of what constitutes a charism. Charisms, almost without exception, have essentially been hijacked by the Pentecostal tradition and its subsequent offspring in the last century. Rather then accept a rather narrow definition of charismata the definition must be broadened, to the presence of the Holy Spirit in the expression of the Church that is pointing to an eschatological reality.  This understanding of charismata is supported not only by Küng[22] and Volf[23], but also Moltmann[24], Stronstad[25] and even Barth.[26] If considered seriously and examined thoroughly the broadened language defining what a charism is, and by consequence what it means, lends itself towards a mutual vocabulary between the sacramental and charismatic churches.

That which defines the meaning of a sacrament and that which defines a charism are not mutually exclusive. Both only hold meaning in an eschatological sense, and if understood as being objective within their subjective contexts because of the ministry of the Holy Spirit (as explored earlier), the two have a tremendous amount in common. Ultimately the classical argument about the distinction between the two has to do with the effects of each. With the sacrament being a means of grace conferred for the personal sanctification[27] of the participant and the charism being a means of grace by which the Spirit effects the work of the church through but not necessarily in the life of the participant.[28] The difference, in reality, between the two understandings? Semantics.  The commonality between the two definitions is uncanny; both are the activity of the spirit in the life of the church for salvific purposes that point toward an eschatological hope and reality caught between the “already” and “not yet.”  If the commonality is truly present between the two realities then the ecclesiological consequence is that the sacraments are to be understood as charisms and the charisms, conversely, become sacramental; the barriers between ecumenical belief, rhetoric and praxis breakdown.

Last, the church must be understood as “for the sake of the non-elect.”[29] A church ceases to be The Church when it’s charismatic/sacramental expression loses its missional presupposition and purpose.  A church is only The Church in so much that its primary self-understanding and orientation is focused on the culture and community in which it is particularly located.[30] Once this breaks down it becomes just another cult among the plethora offering personal spiritual salvation in the history of Greco-Roman mysticism.[31]

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[1] Wright, The New Testament and the People of God. (London: Fortress Press, 1992), 447-448.  Wright makes the obvious observation about the baptismal and Eucharistic understandings of the early church, but also adds the category of discipline because of things such as the Didache and the relative similarity between the early Christian community and that of the Essene community, especially in regards to social justice issues.

 

[2] Ibid. 448.

[3] Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology. (Dovers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 231.

[4] Volf, After our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 129. While such a definition of the church is valid, what is needed is a more thorough and yet broad understanding of a charism then Volf seems willing to consent to, which will be explored later.

[5] Ibid. 133-135.  Volf defines the ecclesiality of a church it terms of Matthew 18:20, while ideal and true, it does not constitute a complete definition of the church as it does not seem to acknowledge any sense of objectivity in the activity or experience of the community.

[6] Ibid. 152.

[7] Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology. (Dovers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 137.

[8] Hedges, War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning. (New York, Anchor Books, 2002), 56.

[9] Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology. (Dovers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 105.

[10] Volf, After our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 140-141

[11] Küng, The Church. (New York: Image Books, 1967), 230.

[12] Ware, The Orthodox Church. (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 308.

[13] Lossky, Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976), 176-177.

[14] Zizioulas, Being as Communion. (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), 15.  Interesting to note that all three contemporary Orthodox theologians embrace a view that theirs is the true church and yet have the ability, seeming theological mandate, to embrace those not inside the eastern church in a way beyond the typical ecumenism in the west. See Anglican-Orthodox dialogue and communion.  The Moscow statement of 1976, the Dublin statement in 1984, and the Cyprus agreed statement presented at Lambeth 2008 as “The Church of the Triune God.” Also see Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue by Kallistos Ware.

[15] Küng, The Church. (New York: Image Books, 1967), 169.

[16] Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology. (Dovers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 231-232.

[17]  Küng, The Church. (New York: Image Books, 1967), 215-18.

[18] Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology. (Dovers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 109.

[19] Küng, The Church. (New York: Image Books, 1967), 239-247.

[20] Ibid, The Church: Mandated in truth. Trans. Edward Quinn, (New York; The Seabury Press, 1979), 50-51.  This passage particularly deals with the interaction between the Magisterium and laity and tries to lay out a possible future interaction. An interesting read but not overly pertinent to the current discussion.

[21] Ibid, The Church. (New York: Image Books, 1967), 353.

[22] Ibid, 215-18.

[23] Volf, After our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 129.

[24] Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit. Trans. Margaret Kohl.  Munich: Fortress Press, 1993.  294.

[25] Stronstad, The Charismatic Theology of St. Luke. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1984. 81-82

[26] O’Grady, The Church in the theology of Karl Barth. Washington: Corpus Books, 1968.  250-268.

[27] The Catechism of the Catholic Church.  Image Books, 2^nd edition , 1995.

[28] Stronstad, The Charismatic Theology of St. Luke. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1984. 73. Stronstad makes a strong and clear argument for the purely vocational understanding of the “baptism of the Spirit.”

[29] Wright, The New Testament and the People of God. (London: Fortress Press, 1992), 334, 447.

[30] Volf, After our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 141-147.

[31] Wright, The New Testament and the People of God. (London: Fortress Press, 1992), 152-166.

Chris Hedges on War

Also, a quick quote from Derek Webb that I am sure Mr. Hedges would fully agree with (this is one of my favorites)- “…peace by way of war is like purity by way of fornication, it’s like telling someone murder is wrong, and then showing them by way of execution…”

What do you think about Hedges critique of American nationalism and it’s “cult of death”? Is it to harsh or too Idealistic? Is there a solution and how does the church fit into that? Let me know what you think.

Evil, Sin and Theodicy

A Pertinent Clip From Bishop Wright.

First, the problem of evil is oft understood to be overly complex, but in practicality, the truth is that it simply exists. The real question raised, for the Christian, should not be what are its origins Or who is responsible? But rather, what is its nature? The answer to that question is a discussion that most progressives would rather not have. Evil permeates everything in creation, from all human beings, to all world systems, right on down to natural order of things (see N.T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God). If evil could be defined from a purely and truly biblical point of view what would it look like? The answer can be found in the life of Jesus.

For Christian faith the life of Jesus is the highest possible moral achievement of any human being, perfection. Without spot or blemish; but what kind of goodness did Jesus model, and what does it say about its antithesis? Jesus is perfect selflessness, hope, and humility; Obedience until death, and compassion to the point of self detriment. If these truly are the models absolute virtue, then the definition of evil would have to be a diametrically apposed opposite; selfishness, pride, rebellion, tyranny and indifference. Evil, when understood by this definition is shown to be pervasive throughout not only world culture, and politics but right down into the hearts of every man and women expressed by everyday decisions. It is only by the power of the Holy Spirit, can a human even begin to strive to overcome such pervasive depravity.

Sin is by far a most ambiguous topic to be tackled. Robert Jenson, early in his Systematic Theology, makes this statement, “… [S]tarting from righteousness, sin in inexplicable; starting from sin, righteousness is inexplicable.” By making that declaration Jenson is careful to explain that any attempt at understanding sin in its depths is truly impossible especially from the theological perspective precisely because there is no depth to be known. Later Jenson records Barth quoting Kirkegaard while explaining his own position on the subject as marking an “infinite qualitative difference” between the nature of divine (righteousness) and all else (sin). If the infinite qualitative difference truly exists then the chasm of unknowability can not be bridged from either end. Therefore Jenson’s earlier remark about what exactly sin is makes sense in the light that we can only know sin by negation. “The only possible definition of sin is that it is what God does not want done.”

Jenson, by way of Bath, defines sin primarily as idolatry, but then he continues the argument through several case studies. Particularly, Jenson defines Augustine’s issue of the lustful self as the contorted image of love that has not known maturity through the loss of self. He also persists to sin as injustice, by the self exerting over others again contorting the image of community to serve self. The last explicit definition is sin as despair because of the individual’s concern for self-preservation; it is the perversion of any reverence for life, placing faith in self, rather then in Christ by showing an aversion to taking risks.

If there is a unifying idea behind sin it is that sin by its nature is the beauty of a given thing destroyed by the intention of an individual to utilize it as means toward whatever end the individual has conceived. If sin has an a priori it is that its underlying foundation is always self-exaltation over against the intentionality and sovereignty of God. If companionable, communal or sexual love is the God ordained expression of self given-ness, sin in its contextual proximity to love as lust is the usurping of this intention for the gratification of the self.

In response to all these ideas and questions of evil and sin we must understand that the only time a “Christian” theodicy could be remotely conceivable is a strictly eschatological sense. Since this is unattainable until the return of Christ then the world and the church must relegate itself to the model of life by Jesus, which was His kenotic humility. Anything that seeks its own self promotion, including a “Christian” theodicy (as all to often is the case within classical protestant theology), is acting to the very contrast of the nature of Jesus to begin with. By imposing biblical ideals and morals upon an unwilling population, Christianity becomes the very evil it was established to contend with. Ultimately, Christianity must be willing to serve a culture that does not accept or appreciate it while in humility declaring the gospel that, “Jesus is Lord, and Caesar is not. That in the end, the world will be put to rights.”

Exegesis and Hermeneutics.

Sensibility must be the foundational key when thinking about scripture. Exegesis and hermeneutics is more about sensibility, plausibility and consistency to what we already know about the nature of God. Also, unity in the story of God, and a healthy historical perspective are of the utmost importance while doing exegesis. Plausibility must be a key element when doing exegesis, an example easily being that the author(s) of genesis being Iron Age scribes and/or desert nomads most likely were not trying to scientifically describe the mechanics of creation. The question that the first few chapters of Genesis are asking and then answering are not the when and how necessarily of creation, but the Who and the Why?

Consistency, it’s important that we read the texts of scripture as part of a larger unified story, keeping in mind that the whole is not equal to the some of its parts. The story of creation and fall makes sense only as the prelude to the national history of Israel and the story of Jesus. This kind of an approach always keeps Jesus and His eschatological significance at the center of exegesis, which is where Christian theology ultimately must begin and end.

Last is a healthy historical perspective, always aware that scripture is not autonomous but is the product of its own context and the intentions of its author(s). The four gospel accounts were written as witnesses to what Jesus was like, at different times, in different communities, by different authors for different reasons. A healthy historical perspective will keep in mind, the context and purpose for whatever piece of literature is being examined, which will aid in keeping the exegete from error.

The other issue that must always be on the forefront of anyone attempting exegesis is a healthy dose of self criticism. By examining the potential hidden motives behind why an individual would read a certain text a certain way will help to alleviate any unwarranted hermeneutical and theological conclusions. Anti-foundationalists, like Stanley Grenz, Brian Mclaren or Rob Bell, would argue that it is impossible to read any given text with providing the meaning based upon the reader’s current circumstance. So that a text never truly has meaning in and of it self but rather only has the meaning provided to it by the reader. Though I don’t agree with the total conclusions of postmodern theory as it is developing, I do believe that a valid observation has been made, that ultimately the reader reads his own context into the text. Unlike the deconstructive postmodern purist listed above, I do believe that by self examination one can arrive at a much clearer picture of the text’s original intent and therefore ascertain the truth being communicated.

Your thoughts?

Love as Revelation.

“Lovers are the ones who know most about God” (Hans urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible).  The concept which he later expounds in the chapters of Love Alone is Credible deals respectively with love as revelation and also in “love as justification and faith,” its simply stated in the preface, that those who love, or those who know love are those that truly know God. For von Balthasar, to love and to know love as object distinct from ones self is by its nature to truly know God. The nature of the trinity is pure agape, but also eros, which is manifest for the sake of the individual persons of the trinity and from whose overflow all other reality has its true essence, sustenance and origin. If this is true, that love in the essence and substance of reality then it can be logically deduced that those that know love and by virtue of that love, are those that not only and truly know God, but also those that are truly human and are participating fully in reality. The statement that von Balthasar profoundly makes is not only true but its implications far exceed its original intentions. The trinity as being the model of agape makes possible human eros and in that eros the Spirit owns and transforms, for the sake of the incarnation, it into an agape otherwise unrealized and unattainable for humanity. If by somehow an individual were to think themselves (as all to often many do) as having access to some knowledge of the divine or perhaps an anthropological apprehension of the historical Jesus, over against the love encounter of the present Christ by way of either the Eucharist or knowing oneself and others as object of true love they are deceiving themselves. Living under a deception that takes it theological roots in either Gnosticism or in Pelagian pull yourselves up by the proverbial moral boot straps (N. T. Wright Romans in a week). Neither of these conceptions can be open to the Christian whose only purpose is to be loved by the trinity and as an outgrowth and understanding of that love responds to God and the rest of humanity in the same manner. Then it can certainly be adequately stated that lovers are those that k now God best, but further that lovers are the only ones who truly know God and only they can truly be called disciples as they are the only ones able to respond and follow Christ. Whether it takes time, contemplation or experiencing the objectivity of love in the Eucharist, or somehow a combination of all these, the first primary and only thing necessary for the Christian is to know the love of God, that emanates from the Father by the Spirit in the Son for the sake of humanity, only when one begins to grasp that can any theology or ministry take place.

Let me know what you think.

A new way to think about Easter and the atonement.

The culmination of the often unconscious and unuttered hopes held in common by all humanity finds itself expressed in a single event. A particular event that happened at a particular time in history to a particular individual is what Christianity claims to be the basis for understanding the human condition and all reality. In order to properly address the atonement achieved through Jesus Christ, certain criteria must first surround any dialogue. These criteria include its Trinitarian implications, its particular effects and its relational reconciliation.

The Trinitarian implications made by either the use of analogous language or by the assumptions about the nature of the inter-Trinitarian relationship are the most important issues while considering what kind of language to employ. First, any language used to describe either directly or analogously the intricate relationships between father son and spirit in Christian theology must be understood to be inadequate at best. Though the common understanding of the mystery of the Trinity gives rise to a certain level of linguistic privilege while trying to explain the way in which the Trinity interacts, especially in relation to the atonement, one must be careful not to allow too much privilege which can lead to a distorted understanding. J.I. Packer initially agrees, “And theories about any of these things that used human analogies to dispel the dimension of mystery would deserve our distrust, just as rationalistic theories about the cross do.”[1] Though he continues to later support and uphold a view of the atonement that sharply divides the trinity against itself and that God is somehow constrained and subject to a separate universal moral law.[2] Ultimately such a view of the atonement, such as penal substitution, leaves Christ along with the rest of humanity cut off from the father in the intra-Trinitarian life by an omnipotent moral law. Rather then regressing to language such as the judiciary analogy, atonement theology would be better served in finding more applicable language that conveys a better representation of the nature of the three divine persons.

Arguably the best language to use while trying to grasp the significance of Christ’s death lies in the very names given to denote the uniqueness of each divine person, rather than abstract analogies devised centuries ago that do little to shed light on the divine mysteries; though accurately demonstrating then-current theological and societal self-awareness. The Father should be seen as a father rather then a medieval monarch or the epitome of the judge presiding over Kant’s universal law. The Son, rather then being seen as a cosmic scapegoat, ought to be seen as the obedient son in whom all things become reconciled. Barth declares:

This God is the God who in Jesus Christ created heaven and earth, and man on the border between heaven and earth, the God, who again in Jesus Christ, has accepted man—man who had fallen away from Him and been lost, but not lost to Him—and also the whole world which he had created. This is the God whose, plan and purpose it is, once more in Jesus Christ, ‘to bring together all things’ at the last day, in which everything, and man in the midst, will be revealed in the glory of Him who at the goal of all His judgments and ways will be all in all. This God is God in such a way that He is free grace in all His deeds.[3]

God the Father and Jesus the begotten Son cannot and should not be opposed to one another in any understanding of the atonement.

How then does one talk about the atonement so as to do justice to the trinity? The answer to that question must be unflinchingly relational. The language describing the atonement and its significance must be understood from the perspective of a father to son relationship that has purely reconciliatory and creational effects. It must also be understood in a strictly Christo-centric fashion as reconciliation, in that, in the being of Jesus, God as man, God has unified and reconciled creation and creator. Barth,

The reconciliation of the world with God takes place in the person of a man in whom, because He is also true God, the conversion of all men to God in an actual event. It is the person of a true man, like all other men in every respect, subjected without exception to all the limitations of the human situation. The conditions I which other men exist and their suffering are also His conditions and His suffering.[4]

Jesus, and his accomplishment on the cross, ought to be understood as the act in which the reconciliation of all things begins and has its eventual eschatological end.

Reconciliation should not be understood as the act that accomplishes in a traditional cause-effect relationship, where Jesus is responding to humanity in an unintended, uncharacteristic fashion, instead it ought to be thought of extension of the original will of God and accomplished by His compassionate nature. God, by sharing in the human experience of limitation and suffering, unites humanity and divinity in the person and life of Jesus Christ. The achievement of the atonement, rooted in the incarnation is that humanity and divinity now have shared experiences, and in those shared experiences are able to participate in each others lives. The point is eloquently stated by Henry Scougal:

They know by experience that true religion is a union of the soul with God, a real participation of the Divine nature, the very image of God drawn upon the soul, or, in the apostle’s phrase, ‘it is Christ formed within us’. Briefly, I know not how the nature of religion can be more fully expressed, then by calling it a Divine Life.[5]

Any participation in the divine life, along with how that is practically achieved in the life of the individual and the life of the church, is a discussion for another day. Though, what can be said about the implications of humanity’s vicarious participation in the true death of Christ, (and by consequence, death of God) has been addressed by renowned catholic theologian, Hans urs von Balthasar:

But this ‘being dead with him’ does not at all imply a ‘being drawn with him into the abyss’, since: he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised. The descent of One alone into the abyss became the ascent of all from the same depths, and the condition of possibility for the dialectical change-about lies on the one hand in the ‘for all’ of the descent, and on the other in the prototypical Resurrection….[6]

Several hopeful summations can be made by understanding the atonement in such a light as the compassionate participation view, summations that share much in common with other methods of viewing and discussing the atonement. First, the victory that Christ’s death achieves, which is the victory over against the greatest enemy that God (and consequently creation) has ever had, death. A distinction here must be made from that of “Christus Victor”, in that Jesus is conducting warfare in any real sense against some opposite dualistic personified power[7], but rather conquers the condition of creation, the slavery of humanity to death by means of self-centered disobedience.

Another similarity that can be noted is the vicariousness of the compassionate atonement. Vicarious only in the sense of what Jesus did for us in his obedient suffering, death and vindicating resurrection, over against a propitiative view of substitution where Jesus died instead of us. Such a view of propitiation, like that described by John Stott[8], in the atonement must be rejected, not only for what it implicitly declares about the trinity, but also for its depiction of God as being not unlike a pagan deity that needs to be appeased. What Christ did for us, and continues to do for us through the activity of the Holy Spirit and our participation in His life and death, is conquering of death, the reconciliation of God and man by shared suffering, and the eschatological participation in the revelation of God’s glory through new creation that is resurrection.

The last similarity, a compassionate understanding holds with other view of the atonement is the influence of life of Jesus upon our lives. Bonhoeffer:

If however, the work of Christ is the work of God, then I am summoned to act like God or to imitate God zealously, but instead I am convicted by this work as one who in no way can do it by myself. Rather I have found the gracious God, through this Jesus Christ, in this knowledge and in this work. My sin has been forgiven. I am not dead but alive. It depends therefore on the person of Christ, whether his work is passing away according to the old world of death or whether it is eternal according to a new world of life.[9]

Rather then seeing Christ’s death as meaningless except to show us a moral way to live, Bonhoeffer, among others, declares that His death as the work of God motivates humanity to imitate Him while doing so only under the grace of God and empowerment of the Holy Spirit.

Ultimately, the Atonement must be understood as being a relational reconciliation. God acting in history on behalf of humanity, Wright agrees in stating, “Jesus death achieves… a reinterpretation of being the people of God… and, an inauguration of Israel’s eschatological hope.”[10] Jesus by fundamentally redefining the way in which humanity interacts with its creator, He restores the relationship between God and man that was so inconceivably marred. A relationship marred mostly by humanity’s misunderstanding of God caused by our slavery to death as a result of disobedience. Christ in the incarnation unites creation and creator, and in His suffering and death atones for humanity by reversing our disobedience through His obedience. He reconciles us to God on the grounds of shared experiences and participation in each others’ life. He is vindicated by the Father in the resurrection by the power of Holy Spirit, displaying that unified will and disposition of God as always being for Man. The Trinity, in the atonement of Jesus, takes personal responsibility for all creation, and elevates it back into the life of God.

In order to properly understand all the implications of the atonement certain criteria must be established for any dialogue to be fruitful. These criteria include its Trinitarian implications, its particular effects and its relational reconciliation. Ultimately the conclusion must be that the Trinity is for humanity, and actually achieved victory over death along with the reconciliation of creation to God by sharing in the experiences of Jesus. In that sharing of Jesus experiences, humanity is brought to one with God, to be in God, which was whole point of creation in first place (Col.1.16.).

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[1] J.I. Packer, In My Place Condemned He Stood, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2007), 58.

[2] Ibid, 82.

[3] Karl Barth, God Here and Now, Trans. Paul m. van Buren, (New York: Routledge Classics, 2003), 35.

[4] Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Trans. G. W. Bromiley, (New York: Continuum Books, 2004), 155.

[5] Henry Scougal, The Life of God in the Soul of Man, (Ross-shire, Scotland, GB: Christian Focus Publications, 1996) 44.

[6] Hans urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, Trans. Aidan Nichols, (Edinburgh, Scotland, GB: T&T Clark, 1990), 53.

[7] Greg Boyd, God at War, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 238.

[8] John Stott, The Cross of Christ, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 167.

[9] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Who is Christ for Us?, Trans. Craig Nessan, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 38-39.

[10] N.T. Wright, The Contemporary Quest for Jesus, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002) 53.

Postmodernity and Deconstruction.

Worlds change; cultures evolve, and societies, not unlike people, are never stagnant. When cultures progress through times of transition, it is often difficult to understand their nuance and complexities, to discern right from wrong in an age of moral dilemma, or truth in an age of skepticism. While trying to understand the challenges that are posed from within, as well as without, in a given culture, the waters of rationality in religion can become particularly murky. For these reasons it becomes imperative to attain a percipient grasp of the bankruptcy of deconstruction in postmodern hermeneutics by examining the genesis of deconstructive criticism, the varieties of postmodern worldviews and the general repercussions of a postmodern hermeneutic.

Understanding the genesis of deconstructive criticism is important to one’s ability to properly evaluate its current impact and possible future effect on society. The first principle component to understanding the genesis of deconstructive criticism is its sociological beginnings. The socio-cultural groundwork laid to prepare the way for the acceptance of deconstruction includes, but is not limited to: “[C]ultural and political changes that marked the last decades of the twentieth century. . . the collapse of the bipolar political world of the cold war, the globalization of trade. . . the rapid spread of new information and communication technologies; the rise of. . . popular culture. . . .”[1] The Cultural Revolution that swept North America and Western Europe in the sixties created an atmosphere of distrust for anything that came before it. A divorce from modernity was filed in the hearts and minds of an entire generation that grew increasingly distrustful of any and every presupposition. “Postmodernism is another protest movement from within modernity.”[2] Culminating with fall of the Berlin wall, postmodernism’s rejection of modernity made its way from the broader culture into the professional, academic and theological world.[3] The societal beginnings of deconstructive criticism are crucial to understanding its genesis and academic establishment.

With the cultural foundation sufficiently laid, the moment was ripe for the philosophical articulation of the unuttered feelings of a new generation of scholars; Jacques Derrida became that voice.[4] Though, before Derrida and his success can be properly understood one must acknowledge even he had predecessors. Laying the groundwork for the eventual development of deconstruction Martin Heidegger began in the nineteen thirties to try and redefine the ontological significance of texts themselves.[5] Couple such uncertainty with the now widely accepted subjectivity of all experience and knowledge as espoused by Kierkegaard[6] as well as other existentialists, and it becomes increasingly easy to understand how and why deconstruction was born. Derrida coined the term deconstruction to describe his method of literary and philosophical criticism. Derrida’s use of deconstruction is textual in that it is concerned with addressing the idea of the meaning of given texts.[7] To illustrate the point Derrida uses his new tool of deconstruction to make a clear distinction between Platonism and what Plato’s classical texts actually say. In the same breath he reinterprets Rousseau and criticizes the idea of onto-theology, Derrida sets himself up as the logical successor of Martin Heidegger, with his theory of linguistics and criticism of anything onto-theo-logical.[8] The philosophical roots of deconstructive criticism are one of the two key elements to understanding its genesis. When taken together, a clearer picture of the causes of the development of deconstructive criticism, as well as postmodernism as a whole, is able to be perceived much more easily.

If it is important to understand the origins of deconstruction, then it is equally if not more imperative to grasp the varieties of postmodern worldviews that have since developed. The first and more caustic variant of such worldviews is the deconstructive purist. “When seen from the cultural perspective, postmodernity’s main ‘sin’ is the denial of objective, absolute truth in favor of total scientific and cultural relativism. . . Not surprisingly the postmodern notion that texts are incapable of conveying meaning upsets biblical theologians.”[9] Two of most notable proponents of such a worldview within Christian theology Dr. Stanley Grenz and Dr. John Franke make clear their disregard for any other approach to epistemology by caricaturing modernity; “The problem of error and the quest for epistemological certainty – the quest for a means by which we can justify our claims to knowledge – dates at least to the ancient Greeks… [And] became acute in the enlightenment.”[10] The corrosiveness of such a disposition towards certainty becomes poignantly clear when applied to Christian theology, which by its very nature makes particular ontological claims about cosmos, being, and deity. This form of postmodernism, that is the deconstructive purist, must be distinguished from its cultural cousin in order to properly understand the varieties of postmodern thought and their eventual effect on the development of epistemology.

The second and more subtle worldview held by proponents of deconstruction is that of the masked modernist liberal. “Challenging absolute and objective points of view does not assume that there are no ‘absolutes,’ as some postmodernists believe but does challenge pretentious scholars maintaining a ‘God’s eye view’.”[11] The second version of postmodernism tends towards intellectual duplicity in that it will unhesitatingly question the epistemological claims of anyone that does not already agree with its own presuppositions. In effect, it uses the language and tool of deconstruction in order to institute an agenda that much more resembles the beliefs of late-modern protestant liberalism, who were at one time so keen on higher criticism. Case in point, “[Y]ou won’t find a traditional statement of faith here. We don’t have a problem with faith, but with statements. Whereas statements of faith and doctrine have a tendency to stifle friendships, we hope to further conversation. . . .”[12] Though the language of this statement may seem unimposing, the meaning of what is actually being stated by Emergent Village is simply that the organization does not appreciate certitude or ontological claims about Christianity. Emergent would rather see a more relativistic or pluralist approach to Christianity fostered. Emergent Village is the prime example of the second variety of postmodernism, simply those that would use the precepts of deconstruction to suit the purposes of advancing a modernist liberal agenda. When understood separately and within their respective contexts, the two primary forms of postmodern worldviews begin to demonstrate the pervasiveness of deconstructive thought; in addition they set the stage for understanding their eventual consequences.

Now that a basic knowledge of the origins and varieties of deconstructive thought has been established, one may begin to examine some of the general repercussions of postmodern hermeneutics. Relativistic pluralism is the first and probably most evident of the results in accepting the precepts of deconstructive hermeneutics. “The question is not about objectivity, but about universality and authority.”[13] Here the concept could not have been stated more concisely; the issue raised, when applying deconstruction to biblical hermeneutics or traditional Christian ontology, is the immediate questioning of their respective authority and universality, relegating both claims simply to a particular historical and cultural context that may not apply in current society or cross culturally. This then opens Pandora’s proverbial box to accepting the claims of other ontological systems, understood within their contexts as being equally valid, though arguably remaining equally uncertain. Dr. John MacArthur, pastor, author and seminary president, argues that “Postmoderism’s preference for subjectivity over objectivity makes it inherently relativistic.”[14] The first casualty of applying a deconstructive hermeneutic to Christianity will remove any amount of certitude in its ontological claims thus pave the way for relativistic pluralism.

Cultural moral decay is arguably the second and more subtle casualty of the application of deconstructive disposition. The world renowned New Testament scholar and bishop of Durham, N.T. Wright, while discussing the mindset of postmoderns toward Christianity, states:

Such charges have a habit of rebounding – not least on those who insist on promoting the unstable worldview of late-modern and postmodern western culture to a position of pre-eminence, and then try to climb on top of it, claiming it as high moral ground, and looking down on all who went before them.[15]

Bishop Wright is describing that the allegorical ground which postmodernism stands on, the self-proclaimed humility or cultural sensitivity is actually counterintuitive in that it unravels the very morality and values that Christendom is actually trying to construct. Similarly, MacArthur[16] testifies that postmodern philosophy in a Christian context suggests that the church ought to make friends with the values of the world rather than confront them. Subtle though it may be, an unavoidable result of deconstructing the ontology of Christian claim begins the unraveling of its moral ground.

The third result of a postmodern hermeneutic is also possibly the most counterintuitive to its proponents, which is nihilism. Interestingly, Christian theology and hermeneutics when married with deconstruction and postmodern worldviews tends to implode into a self-defeating system of arguing against hopelessness. This in turn produces a doctrine that exalts the pointlessness of existence. Hopeless humanity in need of a savior is greeted by hopeless nihilistic theology in need of purpose and ontological truth. Nietzsche’s dream of religion and human understanding of reality divorced from what he saw as the dreadful stench of dogmatic institutional morality is finally being realized in deconstructive theology.[17] “To what extent the new warlike age upon which Europeans have obviously entered may perhaps also be favorable to the evolution of a new and stronger species of skepticism.”[18] Postmodernism and the exaltation of the uncertainty of all meaning in texts demonstrated by deconstructive hermeneutics is exactly what Nietzsche dreamed of at the turn of the last century. In reaction to the perceived failure of modernism, deconstruction and the postmodern worldview have played right into the very essence of the ultimate hope of modern progressivism, a world without truth or God.[19] Nihilism must be understood as the logical end as well as one of the general repercussions of a postmodern hermeneutic.

The final, and certainly most drastic, repercussion of a deconstructive postmodern hermeneutic is eventual Christian dogmatic castration. “Classical and modern societies achieved legitimation through metaphysics. In the postmodern condition, where metaphysics and metanarratives are no longer credible sources of legitimation, who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?”[20] By attempting to unravel the basis for the establishment of knowledge and then redefining knowledge altogether, deconstruction taken to its logical end leaves Christianity with nothing to say ontologically or objectively. Christianity then becomes one of many defeated pre-modern or modern relics of a debunked experiment known as epistemology; the only legitimate contribution it can make is as commentary upon its own context. “Postmodernism, though beneficial in its questioning of the enlightenment and late modern suppositions, is ultimately detrimental in that it answers those questions inappropriately.”[21] Ultimately deconstructive postmodern thought leaves Christianity ontologically castrated. Understanding the sum of the general repercussions of a deconstructive postmodern hermeneutic, its relativistic pluralism, cultural moral decay, the counterintuitive nihilism and its dogmatic castration, will empower one to understand the possible future pitfalls in an increasingly postmodern culture and theology.

Ultimately all theology, epistemology, and ontology, no matter how well argued must be rooted in the real world. N. T. Wright:

“It is the real world that the tyrants and bullies (including intellectual and cultural tyrants and bullies) try to rule by force, only to discover that in order to do so they have to quash all. . . that would imply their greatest weapons, death and deconstruction, are not after all omnipotent. . . It is the real world that. . . historians are committed to studying. And. . . it is the real world in and for which Christians are committed to living. . . .”[22]

It is for the purpose of better understanding the challenges that face the real world and the possible implications of certain popular worldviews that one must begin to grasp the bankruptcy of deconstruction in postmodern hermeneutics. Examining the origins, discerning the different varieties, as well as understanding the possible implications of deconstructive thought will better equip one to engage the current culture and anticipate the future of popular thought in an ever-evolving society.

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[1] Peter J. Leithart, Solomon Among the Postmoderns, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 13.

[2] Ibid, 35.

[3] John MacArthur, The Truth War, (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2007), 10.

[4] Peter J. Leithart, Solomon Among the Postmoderns, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008),

[5] Martin Heiddegger, Being and Time, Trans. Joan Stambaugh, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 35.

[6] Soren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, Trans. Douglas V. Steere (New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1956), 65.

[7] Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?”, Andrews University Seminary Studies, (Vol. 44.1, 2006), 100.

[8] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Trans. Gayatri Chakarvorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 283.

[9] Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?”, Andrews University Seminary Studies, (Vol. 44.1, 2006), 97.

[10] Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 83.

[11] A. Gerhard Van Wyk, “Beyond Modernism: Scholarship and ‘Servanthood’”, Andrews University Seminary Studies, (Vol. 38.1, 2000), 90.

[12] Emergent Village, (accessed Nov 10, 2008)

[13] Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?”, Andrews University Seminary Studies, (Vol. 44.1, 2006), 101.

[14] John MacArthur, The Truth War, (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2007), 12.

[15] N. T. Wright, Christian Origins and the Question of God Volume Three: the Resurrection of the Son of God, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 735.

[16] John MacArthur, The Truth War, (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2007), 199.

[17] Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (New York: Peguin Putnam, 2003), 76.

[18] Ibid, 138.

[19] Ibid, 193.

[20] Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?”, Andrews University Seminary Studies, (Vol. 44.1, 2006), 101.

[21] Chris Green, Lecture on Systematic Theology, Oral Roberts University, Oct. 15, 2008.

[22] N. T. Wright, Christian Origins and the Question of God Volume Three: the Resurrection of the Son of God, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 737.

The Bible – It’s Authority and Role in Theology

Is the Bible The “Word of God?”

The bible is the word of God in so much as it is a human record of what God is like, by way of authoritatively witnessing to who Jesus is and only within the context of the apostolic tradition of the church. Far too much emphasis, I believe, has been placed in the evangelical community and the protestant tradition as a whole on the “pure text” of the bible ever since the early days of the reformation. In an ill conceived attempt to justify a rejection of “overbearing tradition” (Luther) that had become in the eyes of reformers apostate, the idea of Sola Scriptura was born. Though well meaning in their intentions to return to a purer form of Christianity, all that was actually achieved was the opening of Pandora’s Box to innumerable interpretations of the text that actuality reflected more of the exegete’s presuppositions.

In addition to the problems raised by interpretation, the historical issue to be addressed. The question that an individual must come to terms with while trying to subscribe to fundamentalist perspective of the bible is how it developed. If a person wants to subscribe to inerrancy then they’ll have to do quite a bit logical gymnastics, with the end result leaving with one of two options. The must subscribe to either plenary dictation, or mechanical verbal dictation, regardless of the fact that both do not do much justice to the history of canonization or allow for the quite obvious differences between the different writers. Rather then either or these options, the way in which the bible should be understood is through a historical perspective that remains with the tradition of the church, for that is how it developed in the first century. Before there were any written gospels there was the Kerygma, the oral tradition, the preaching that gave birth to the church in the first century under the leadership of the apostles. It wasn’t until decades or a century later that the traditions were compiled. This fact however, does not discredit there accuracy as authoritative witnesses. It is in this fashion, that the bible being a collection of literature, thousands of years old, is an authoritative witness to who the original authors believed God and Jesus to be and what the understood Him to be like.

Often critized by his detractors, Karl Barth held a view of scripture that laid its authority only on the fact that underlying the books themselves was the revelation of God in the man Jesus.

to the extent that the Bible really attests revelation it is no less the Word of God than revelation itself. As the Bible and proclamation become God’s Word in virtue of the actuality of revelation, they are God’s Word: the one Word of God within which there can be neither a more nor a less. Nor should we ever try to understand the three forms of God’s Word in isolation. The first, revelation, is the form that underlies the other two (CD I/1, 120-121).

The distinction can best be illustrated by understanding what it is that the Christianity of the Creeds actually believes.  Even from the other major monotheistic religions, Christianity is unique. Unique in the sense that it does not hold to Liber-ation, or the exaltation of a book being somehow divine. Christianity does not claim that its book floated down from heaven. Rather what the church does claim, and I believe Barth is brilliantly picking up on, is Incarnation. That God revealed Himself in history as a Man and as a consequence of that scripture’s authority comes from that it accurately witnesses to who that Man is. What are your thoughts?

Open Theism and the Providence Debate

. Is God responsible for everything that happens?

Please watch this short clip of Dr. Greg Boyd giving an overview of Open Theism

This is perhaps one of the most complex theological issues that can be discussed, I figured why not start with a difficult topic, right? Providence affects every other area of theological discourse. Ultimately, though, when this question is posed the actual question that is being asked without being directly articulated is, “Is God responsible for evil? And if so, in what manner?” No matter which direction an individual leans, either that of an open Kenotic view or a more classical view on providence, certain issues must be kept in mind while approaching the subject. First, is what does this say about God’s character? If you assign yourself to a classical view then in some way God becomes responsible for evil either by inaction or by volition. If one chooses the opposite stance, a risk theory, where God kenotically knows all possible outcomes without the actual one, then what does that say about His actual ability to influence things for a possible outcome, is God still omniscient or is that a term we ascribe to Him that is unjustified?

Part of me leans toward an open view of God, for a couple of reasons. First, it maintains the depictions of God in the Old Testament and of Jesus as authentic, the perfect example being that of the Sodom and Gomorrah story (Gen.18), but also the story of Jonah preaching to Nineveh and that city’s subsequent repentance (Jonah 3). Also it stands in line with the revelation of the character of God as revealed in the life of Jesus and His Kenosis in the incarnation. Secondly, it exonerates God from being responsible for evil that occurs, for in this scheme God is interacting and reacting with humanity as pure free agents that apart from intervention are independent of influence. Thirdly, as previously stated, it maintains a truly free relationship between man and God, for because God does not know before hand, man is therefore outside influence and is an actual free agent (Boyd, God at War) and a result man’s action actually matter, what decisions he or she makes has significance, what he/she does or does not do, prays or does not pray.

On the other hand, I have had a difficult time releasing by predisposition towards a classical view of God’s omniscience. So for now, the best answer I can give to the issue of providence, is, I don’t know. What are your thoughts?